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New Horizons in Cartel Detection
Jonathan B. Baker*
My comments will address briefly two issues motivated by the interest-
ing articles on price-fixing by Professor William Kovacic and Gary Spratling.
Before doing so, I want to take a moment to note that wherever Bill Kovacic
teaches, law review symposia on antitrust quickly follow. Bill is an inspiring
mentor, arid the students at George Washington are lucky indeed that he has
landed here. The two issues I will address are whether it is difficult to detect
cartels, and how antitrust enforcers can improve detection efforts.
It may seem odd to begin by asking whether antitrust enforcers have
problems detecting cartels. After all, they appear to catch a lot. Most nota-
bly, every few decades, a shocking, high-profile cartel case involving large
firms captures public attention. When the electrical equipment cartel involv-
ing General Electric and Westinghouse was uncovered around 1960, the com-
pany faced fines and expensive private follow-on damages litigation,
executives went to jail, and books were written about the case.' The lysine
and vitamins cartels, uncovered recently, were treated similarly in the courts
and the press.2 In addition, illegal cartels are often uncovered at other times,
with less public attention. The Antitrust Division has successfully prosecuted
price-fixing criminally in a wide range of industries, including multiple cases
involving such routine activities as road building and school milk procure-
ment contracts. 3 Another example involves the Antitrust Division's civil
price-fixing case, settled by consent, against the major airlines and their Air-
line Tariff Processing Co. ("ATP") joint venture during the early 1990s.
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I See generally JOHN G. FULLER, THE GENTLEMAN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF THE
PRICE-FIXERS IN THE ELECrRICAL INDUSTRY (1962); JOHN HERLING, THE GREAT PRICE CON-
sPIRACY: THE STORY OF THE ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY (1962);
Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial Admin-
istration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621 (1964); Additional Sentences in Antitrust Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
1961, at 16.
2 See generally KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT (2000); JAMES B. LIEBER, RATS IN
THE GRAIN: THE DIRTY TRICKS AND TRIALS OF ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND (2000).
3 See 60 Minutes with Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 57
ANTrrRUST L.J. 257, 259-60 (1988) (reporting that in 1987 the Antitrust Division filed criminal
cases against electrical contractors, road builders, antique-auction pools, and others); Constance
K. Robinson, Developments in Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 649, 650
(1992) (describing criminal cases and investigations in "diverse areas of the economy" including
road-building, industrial hardware, health care, public auctions, soft drink bottling, school bus
bodies, billboards, waste disposal, the government securities industry, and milk); Anne K. Bin-
gaman & Gary R. Spratling, Joint Address Before the Criminal Antitrust Law and Procedure
Workshop, ABA Section of Antitrust Law (Feb. 23, 1995) (describing criminal cases involving
steel wool scouring pads, residential flush doors, milk and dairy products sold to schools and the
military, construction contracts, and crawfish), available at http://www.usdoj.govlatrlpublicl
speeches/95-02-23.htm.
4 United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,687 (D.D.C.
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With so much enforcement activity, do many instances of price-fixing go
undetected? Do antitrust enforcers merely catch the tip of the iceberg, par-
ticularly with respect to cartels among large firms? As a matter of theory,
one would expect that given the level of enforcement activity, those cartels
that have taken steps to make detection by enforcers the most difficult would
remain. An analogy will clarify the point. Many highways have high occu-
pancy traffic lanes for use during rush hour only by cars carrying one or more
passengers as well as the driver. The police can most easily identify as viola-
tors those automobiles with only one head sticking up. It will be more diffi-
cult for the troopers to identify solo drivers who have propped up a dummy
in the passenger seat. Accordingly, when the police increase resources de-
voted to preventing drivers without passengers from using high occupancy
lanes, one would expect them to catch most of the single drivers but only a
smaller fraction of the drivers engaging in more deceptive tactics. Similarly,
in policing cartels, higher enforcement activity can be expected to catch most
of the easy-to-detect violators, but a smaller proportion of the hard-to-detect
violators.5
Accordingly, the question of whether much price-fixing goes undetected,
and thus whether antitrust enforcers need new tools to detect cartels, turns
on whether there are many cartels that take precautions to make themselves
hard to detect. It is obviously difficult to estimate this number because the
cartels we seek to count are, after all, hard to detect. On the one hand, the
main reason to suspect that there may be many undetected cartels is that
when the tools for catching price-fixing improve-as with the amnesty pro-
gram described by Gary Spratling-antitrust enforcers find more, and per-
haps more harmful, cartels. I will have more to say about those tools shortly.
On the other hand, the main reason to suspect that few undetected car-
tels remain is the plausible possibility that the recent run of large price-fixing
cases may represent a one-time change in business practice, by which an old
culture of interfirm cooperation is ending. According to this story, it took the
GE-Westinghouse case for large U.S. firms to recognize the need to alter
their internal procedures governing relationships with rivals and develop
methods of ensuring antitrust compliance. The ATP airline price-fixing case
may have done something similar for the deregulating airline industry, which
apparently had to learn not to cooperate. Finally, the run of recent high pro-
file international price-fixing cases against well-known defendants like
Archer Daniels Midland, Hoffman-La Roche and Sotheby's may now be
teaching large firms in Europe and Japan lessons that most U.S. firms were
forced to learn in earlier decades.
Aug. 10, 1994) (final judgment); United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 1993-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,410 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 1993) (final judgment); see also United States v. Airline Tariff
Publ'g Co., 59 Fed. Reg. 15,225 (March 31, 1994) (proposed final judgment and competitive
impact statement); United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 58 Fed. Reg. 3,971 (Jan. 12,
1993) (proposed final judgment and competitive impact statement).
5 Cf. Jonathan B. Baker, Private Information and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Dam-
ages Remedies, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORo. 385, 402 (1988) (welfare effects of detrebling private anti-
trust damages depend in part on distribution of potential cartels with respect to ex ante
probability of successful antitrust enforcement).
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Even if recent cartel enforcement reflects the effects of a systemic
change in business culture for the better, rather than a sign that widespread
price-fixing lies under the surface in many markets, hidden from detection,
developing improved approaches to cartel detection is all to the good. In this
area of antitrust, I am skeptical of arguments that antitrust enforcement
overdeters legitimate conduct, presumably in the form of inducing excessive
efforts at compliance with the prohibitions on price-fixing and bid-rigging.
There is no serious evidence, for example, that firms are limiting joint ven-
ture formation or legitimate trade association activity for fear of being
charged with price-fixing. 6 Accordingly, I will turn now to survey the range
of approaches available for detecting price-fixing and its cognates, bid-rigging
and market division.
Methods of cartel detection fall into three categories, which I will de-
scribe as (1) enlisting the victims, (2) encouraging cartel participants to turn
themselves in, and (3) identifying cartels from economic evidence. Antitrust
law enlists the victims primarily by allowing private lawsuits for treble dam-
ages. This method has limitations. In practice, according to Professor Lande,
the damages remedy is actually closer to single damages on average.7 More-
over, private lawsuits against cartels are often follow-ons to government
cases, suggesting that the victims do more to promote deterrence than to
bring cartels to light.8
Both Gary Spratling and Bill Kovacic emphasize a second approach to
cartel detection: encouraging cartel participants to turn themselves in. Some
strategies involve sticks. Price-fixing can lead, among other things, to fines
and treble damages for the firms and imprisonment for their executives. In
addition, a cartel uncovered in one jurisdiction can be prosecuted by multiple
countries. In the United States, penalties have been ratcheted up over time.
Other strategies for encouraging violators to turn themselves in involve
carrots. These include government offers of immunity or lesser penalties for
coming in first and disclosing all price-fixing schemes that may involve the
firm. The Justice Department's amnesty program, introduced in its modern
form in 1993, has been wildly successful, as Gary Spratling, one of its authors,
has detailed in this symposium. There is irony in the use of corporate am-
nesty programs as a basis for cartel detection. This strategy works by placing
6 In his paper in this symposium, Professor Kobiyashi notes the theoretical possibility of
overdeterrence of price-fixing, but he provides no reason to consider that possibility a practical
concern. See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of
the Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
715 (2001).
7 Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHio ST.
L.J. 115 (1993).
8 In addition, the deterrent effects of private damages actions will be reduced to the ex-
tent the victims were aware that they may have been dealing with a cartel when they were
charged a high price by it (and thus more likely someday to blow the whistle by filing a private
lawsuit). When both victim and violator are aware that the victim may sue for damages in the
future, the market price will go up to undo the later damages in an expected sense. Jonathan B.
Baker, supra note 5; see also DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARK=TS § 19.4 (1989);
Stephen W. Salant, Treble Damage Awards in Private Lawsuits for Price Fixing, 95 J. PoL. ECON.
1326, 1327 (1987).
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the firms in a "prisoner's dilemma," making it more attractive for the firm to
"cheat" by revealing all to government enforcers than to "cooperate" by re-
maining silent. The irony is that these are the very markets in which the
usual "prisoner's dilemma" that generates marketplace competition-by
which firms prefer to compete by cutting price rather than cooperate with
their rivals in fixing prices-does not operate.
Professor Kovacic's proposal for a bounty program would also provide a
large carrot to price-fixers for coming forward with information about cartels.
One of the justifications for introducing a bounty program in government
procurement, that it helps remedy a form of government failure, however,
does not apply to antitrust. Some federal procurement agencies are thought
to have been "captured" by contractor interests, and thus to have been un-
willing to challenge suspect industry practices. In contrast to the hypothe-
sized situation in federal procurement, however, there is no reason to think
that the Antitrust Division acts in the interest of price-fixers.
The final approach to cartel detection involves reliance on economic evi-
dence. Two types of economic evidence may be employed. The first evalu-
ates the market structure to determine whether it is plausible that firms can
solve their "cartel problems" of reaching consensus on price and output, de-
terring cheating on that consensus, and discouraging entry.9 These tech-
niques, however, identify necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for cartel
formation, and thus are probably better suited for ruling out industries in
which collusion is unlikely than for identifying industries in which price-fixing
most likely has occurred.10
More recently, economists have developed new empirical methods of
identifying suspicious bidding practices in potential bid-rigging situations.
This has always been done in an informal way. For example, if the prices bid
by all the unsuccessful bidders in a particular procurement auction are identi-
cal to the last digit, it may be plausible to infer that the firms selected that
figure as part of a market division scheme, to avoid undercutting the firm
designated to win the procurement. Indeed, evidence of identical bids to the
Tennessee Valley Authority led a journalist to uncover the electrical equip-
ment cartel.1 More recent econometric approaches take more systematic
looks at the conduct of firms that bid in multiple auctions. They compare the
bidding behavior of the firms in the market suspected of bid-rigging to the
actual bidding behavior of firms that are known to compete12 or to the way
competing firms would be expected to behave given a plausible economic
9 For a recent survey of an extensive economic literature on factors that facilitate and
frustrate collusion, see Simon J. Evenett & Valerie Y. Suslow, Preconditions for Private Re-
straints on Market Access and International Cartels, 3 J. IN'L EcoN. L. 593 (2000).
10 See Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oli-
gopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANmRusr BULL. 143 (1993) (ex-
plaining that if industry economic environment is not conducive to coordination, it would be
irrational for firms to agree on price; but if the industry is fertile ground for coordination, the
firms may be able to exercise market power through price-leadership that falls short of reaching
an agreement).
11 DENNIs W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
127-29 (3d ed. 2000).
12 Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions,
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model.' 3 For example, if firms do not make higher bids when their costs are
greater, or if they systematically raise their bids when a rival lowers its bid, it
may be plausible to infer that those sellers are not behaving competitively.
Detecting price-fixing has historically relied less on economic evidence
than many other areas of antitrust. But with the development of new
econometric tools, economists may come to play a greater role in detecting
cartels in the future. After the successful reinvigoration of the Justice De-
partment's corporate amnesty program, if widespread hidden price-fixing re-
mains to be discovered, new economic approaches such as these may be the
best way to uncover them.
101 J. POL. EcoN. 518, 520-21 (1993); Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Ohio School Milk
Markets: An Analysis of Bidding, 30 RAND J. ECON. 263 (1999).
13 See, e.g., Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, Competition Versus Collusion in Procurement Auc-
tions: Identification and Testing (Feb. 20, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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